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HATE SPEECH, LEGITIMACY, AND THE 
FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF 
GOVERNMENT 
Steven H. Shiffrin* 
In a well-documented, intriguing, and intricately argued 
article, James Weinstein maintains that restrictions on hate 
speech are problematic because they tend to undermine the 
legitimacy of anti-discrimination statutes.1 In so doing, he 
develops an argument previously made by Ronald Dworkin with 
sophistication and with greater complexity and needed detail. He 
argues not only that such restrictions can undermine the 
legitimacy of anti-discrimination laws with respect to their 
popular acceptance, but also with respect to the political 
obligation to obey them and with the morality of their 
enforcement. The general idea is that persons precluded from 
opposing a law are not legitimately subject to the law. 
This argument seems to be an instance of the tail wagging the 
dog. If hate speech restrictions are justifiable, then their 
enforcement cannot undermine the normative legitimacy of anti-
discrimination laws.2 If such restrictions are not justifiable, then 
the impact on anti-discrimination laws is interesting, but not 
central to the case against them.3 In fact, Weinstein argues that 
the restrictions violate fundamental principles of our government 
and what many regard as a fundamental principle of free speech. 
Any legitimate government depends on adherence to the 
 
 * Charles Frank Reavis, Sr., Professor of Law Emeritus, Cornell University. 
 1. James Weinstein, Hate Speech Bans, Democracy and Political Legitimacy, 32 
CONST. COMMENT. 527 (2017). 
 2. I am referring here only to the normative legitimacy of these laws. Weinstein 
suggests the restrictions also weaken the legitimacy of anti-discrimination laws as 
perceived. I think his discussion exaggerates the point, but I do not explore that matter 
here. 
 3. For powerful material supporting hate speech restrictions, see JEREMY 
WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH (reprt. ed. 2014); MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., 
WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT (1993). 
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proposition that government must treat all citizens as having 
equal moral worth, or as Ronald Dworkin put it – with equal 
respect and concern.4 In addition, all citizens should be able to 
participate in the political process as political equals. Weinstein 
maintains that hate speech restrictions violate both these 
principles. In addition, he believes that such restrictions violate a 
First Amendment mandate against point-of-view discrimination. 
I will argue that hate speech restrictions do not violate 
fundamental principles of government, nor are they instances of 
impermissible point-of-view discrimination. I will maintain that 
his claims about the legitimacy of anti-discrimination legislation 
are not as broad or precise as they might appear. And, in 
conclusion, I will maintain that there are concerns about some 
hate speech restrictions that are more telling than the matters to 
which he would call our attention. 
I. RECONCILING HATE SPEECH RESTRICTIONS WITH 
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT AND 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
Weinstein maintains that hate speech restrictions are 
inconsistent with the view that government must treat all citizens 
as having equal moral worth. But this confuses respect for persons 
with respect for the speech with which they wish to engage. Free 
speech doctrine contains many permissible restrictions on speech, 
and it is not obvious that they show disrespect for persons. The 
doctrine permits government to enact speech restrictions 
involving some forms of advocacy of illegal action, some forms of 
defamation, obscenity, copyright violations and the like. 
Whatever the merits of these doctrines, they do not show 
disrespect for a citizen as a citizen. They do not take the position 
that a citizen lacks moral worth. At most, they show disrespect for 
a particular speech choice the citizen would like to make. 
So too, the notion that point-of-view discrimination is 
impermissible is an overgeneralization. Even in the United States, 
a more precise statement of the law would be that point-of-view 
discrimination is impermissible except when it is not. So erotic 
speech directed toward “good old fashioned healthy” interests in 
sex are protected though appeals to prurient interests in some 
 
 4. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 190 (reprt. ed. 1985). 
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cases are not.5 Nasty things said about a person in some contexts 
are unprotected;6 nice things said about the same person are 
protected. Advocacy of illegal action is unprotected in some 
contexts;7 advocacy of legal action is protected. Two explanations 
for these distinctions seem clear. First, the unprotected speech 
causes harm and the protected speech does not.8 Second, in some 
cases, such as obscenity9 (or fighting words10), the speech is 
regarded as less valuable than other forms of speech. The notion 
that speech law does not look at the value of speech is falsified not 
only by obscenity and fighting words doctrine, but also by the view 
that some forms of sexually oriented speech,11 commercial 
speech,12 and private speech13 should be less protected than more 
important political speech. 
There is a strong case for the view that racist speech causes 
harm and lacks substantial constitutional value. As I have written 
elsewhere, racist speech causes  
many well-documented harms: it is an assault on the dignity of 
people of color; it humiliates and causes emotional distress, 
sometimes with physical manifestations; it helps spread racial 
prejudice, not only stigmatizing people of color in the eyes of 
the societally dominant race but also in the eyes of [many of] 
the victims themselves, inspiring self-hatred, isolation, and . . . 
finally, it frequently creates the conditions for violence.14 
Equally important, like other forms of unprotected speech, 
racist speech should fall low in the hierarchy of First Amendment 
values. Most people who would protect such speech recommend 
that course despite its loathsome character, not because of it. To 
 
 5. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 (1985). 
 6. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
 7. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 8. So understood, a restriction on hate speech is not imposed merely because 
government finds the speech disagreeable, disturbing, or offensive as Weinstein suggests. 
Weinstein, supra note 1, at 529. 
 9. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). 
 10. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
 11. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
 12. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978). 
 13. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985). 
 14. STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA 
77 nn.168–69 (2000). These sources do not depend on empirical studies, but the 
experiences of human beings. When speech lacks a strong connection to the values 
underlying the First Amendment, at least in my view, a demand for empirical studies 
before regulation is not defensible. See generally STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, WHAT’S WRONG 
WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT? (2016). 
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be sure, racist speech is not wholly bereft of First Amendment 
value. For example, it has marketplace value in that it reveals the 
existence of racists in the society. Nonetheless, its overall 
contribution to the market is negative in character. That is 
precisely because of the foundational premise of the system. 
Racists argue that government (and others) should not treat all 
citizens will equal respect and concern. If racists have their way, 
people of color will officially not be equal citizens and will not be 
treated as equals in private and public spheres. In other words, 
racists seek to topple the fundamental prerequisites of a 
legitimate society and government. As I have argued elsewhere, 
“[i]n this limited context, the best test of truth is the system’s 
foundational premise of equality, not whether truth can emerge 
triumphant in the market place of ideas.”15 To suggest that speech 
causing substantial harm and designed to overrule the 
fundamental premise of legitimate society and government 
should be protected because of its value should be unthinkable.16 
It follows from this that hate speech restrictions do not deny 
citizens the equal opportunity to participate in the political 
process. The equal opportunity to participate does not imply that 
citizens have the right to engage in speech that is rightly restricted. 
 
 15. SHIFFRIN, supra note 14, at 78. 
 16. To my mind, Weinstein errs when he supposes that hate speech advocates are 
entitled to pursue their hate speech interests, and recognizing that is required by a 
fundamental principle of government. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 538, 541–42. Nor can 
I join Weinstein in supposing that the interest in expressing racist views should be 
protected because they help the speaker confirm his standing as a responsible agent. Id. at 
21. As we have seen, the expression of racist views is harmful and at odds with the system’s 
fundamental principle of equality. They do not show case the agent as responsible. See 
Michael C. Dorf, Liberalism’s Errant Theodicy, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1469 (2013) (exploring the 
limits of the responsible agent argument). The speaker’s interest rightly ranks low in the 
constellation of values. Similarly, the speaker’s interest in “feeling better” in this context 
ranks low, and the speaker’s interests do not outweigh the harm of the speech. Weinstein, 
supra note 1, at 551. 
  Weinstein suggests that racist speech, like communist speech does not 
successfully promote illegitimate government. Id. at 578, n.179. I do not agree with the 
former particularly because the speech further subordinates an already vulnerable group, 
which government has a responsibility to protect, and the speech plays a role in which 
White Americans are privileged over Black Americans in myriad ways at local, state, and 
national levels. In any event, the claim generally underestimates the harm of racist speech. 
On the other hand, assuming some communists argue for the abolition of free speech, I 
believe they too are advocating the overturning of a foundational principle of the system. 
But the harm they create is not comparable to racist speech. 
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The equal opportunity argument trades on the respect argument 
which is itself not defensible.17 
II. THE LEGITIMACY ARGUMENT 
There is a germ of truth in the legitimacy argument. If you 
are precluded from arguing against a law, that should count as a 
factor against enforcing the law against you. Of course, citizens 
are not prevented from arguing against anti-discrimination laws. 
They might argue that a federal law infringes with local rights and 
they might argue that a federal or state civil rights law interferes 
with freedom of association. Weinstein is not contending that 
persons have been denied the ability to argue against such laws in 
these ways. He is arguing that European laws preventing hate 
speech against groups (even if they do not address anti-
discrimination laws) undermine the legitimacy of anti-
discrimination laws. 
A. SYSTEMIC ILLEGITIMACY 
With some exceptions, I find this whole line of arguments 
about legitimacy to be extremely dubious. Anti-discrimination 
laws are designed to protect vulnerable groups in the society, and 
it is strongly arguable that governmental claims of legitimacy are 
strained with respect to many of these groups. Indeed, the 
legitimacy claim of the American government is hard to maintain. 
It is now a commonplace that the government represents lobbyists 
for the rich at the expense of the people. The government itself is 
structured to assure that the majority cannot rule,18 as Charles 
Beard warned long ago.19 And to take an obvious example, we live 
in a racist society in which the government not only fails to assure 
adequate food, clothing, housing, and medical care for African 
 
 17. Weinstein’s contention that Britain’s ban on promoting racial or ethnic 
discrimination while permitting the promotion of racial tolerance is impermissible point-
of-view discrimination reflects the approach a U.S. court would take to the issue. See id. at 
545–46. But the law on point-of-view discrimination is checkered, and the better approach 
would be to recognize that racist speech causes unjustifiable harm and promoting racial 
tolerance does not. 
 18. For example, the United States Senate, the Electoral College, the Presidential 
veto, the gerrymander, and the system of campaign finance. 
 19. CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
(Dover Publ’ns 2004) (1913). If revolution is not justified in the United States, it is not 
because the government is worthy of our respect. It would either be because of pacifist 
principles or because revolution would be unsuccessful or cause more harm than good. 
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Americans (and poor people generally), but it also maintains 
police departments with cultures designed to cover up the police 
murders of unarmed Black men. Restrictions of hate speech are 
designed to reinforce the moral, legal, and political view that 
African Americans are equal citizens, and to prevent the harms 
associated with hate speech. Anti-discrimination laws are 
designed to mitigate the hard edges of illegitimacy in American 
society.20 To put it another way, both hate speech restrictions21 
and anti-discrimination laws are not only permissible, but 
required to make the system more legitimate. 
From this perspective, it seems more than a little odd to argue 
that restrictions on hate speech, which show respect for equal 
citizenship and help to mitigate the racism of an illegitimate 
system should not be enacted for fear that such restrictions would 
undermine the legitimacy of anti-discrimination legislation, 
legislation which also shows respect for equal citizenship and 
helps to mitigate the racism of an illegitimate system. 
To be fair, Weinstein maintains that he is not talking about 
systemic illegitimacy, he is talking about the relationship between 
hate speech restrictions and anti-discrimination legislation 
without reference to systemic illegitimacy. But systemic 
legitimacy cannot be hermetically sealed off from the legitimacy 
of a particular law. If the overall system is illegitimate with respect 
to a particular group, the claim that an anti-discrimination law 
designed to help that group is itself illegitimate becomes 
breathtaking. 
 
 20. Weinstein can be read as supporting Professor Baker’s view that legitimacy 
depends on respect for formal autonomy. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 57778, n.175. The 
dispute between Professor Baker and me cannot be passed off as involving two different 
conceptions of legitimacy. The dispute was primarily about the nature of autonomy and 
the extent to which respect for what Baker characterized as formal autonomy as he 
conceived it was necessary for legitimacy. Baker recognized that infringement of 
autonomy was necessary in any complex society, but he wanted those infringements to be 
carefully limited and he did not want a Millian conception of harm coupled with balancing 
to mark out the acceptable limitations from the unacceptable limitations. Instead, for the 
most part he maintained that autonomy could only be rightly limited when the autonomous 
person engaged in coercion or manipulation and he embarked on an attempt to define 
coercion and manipulation. I argued that Baker’s apparatus designed to improve on John 
Stuart Mill was unsuccessful. Thus, government did not need to forego restrictions on racist 
speech to maintain legitimacy. Steven H. Shiffrin, Freedom of Speech and Two Types of 
Autonomy, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 337, 338–41 (2011). 
 21. In the conclusion, I argue that some hate speech restrictions are unwise. 
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So too, Weinstein seeks to shore up the dam when he 
concedes that the use of vituperative hate speech that stirs up 
racial hatred in expressing opposition to an anti-discrimination 
law does “not seem to destroy, or even substantially diminish” the 
obligation to obey an anti-discrimination measure.22 Yet the most 
influential advocates of restrictions on hate speech do not seek to 
foreclose opposition to anti-discrimination measures, they seek to 
prevent the use of virulent hate speech.23 So Weinstein might be 
counted out as a general opponent of hate speech restrictions. So 
to be clear, it is the expression of non-vituperative prejudiced 
views that Weinstein believes needs to be protected in order to 
protect the legitimacy of anti-discrimination statutes. 
Another qualification by Weinstein seems to give up the 
ghost with respect to racist speech restrictions. He indicates that 
the problem of justifying coercion to a free and autonomous 
person arises only when that person reasonably disagrees with the 
law.24 But Weinstein would have to get up very early in the 
morning to formulate a persuasive case that arguments based in 
racial prejudice amount to reasonable disagreements with the law. 
So too, Weinstein later argues that some laws (most criminal laws) 
are morally imperative and are not rendered illegitimate. Only 
laws about which there can be reasonable disagreement are 
subject to his concern about illegitimacy. Yet in a society rife with 
racial discrimination, it seems clear that anti-discrimination laws 
are themselves morally imperative. 
The significance of this should be clear. Much of the 
literature on hate speech has focused on racist speech. Weinstein’s 
argument simply does not apply to the paradigm case of hate 
speech. 
B. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND HATE SPEECH 
Weinstein searches for examples, therefore, outside the area 
of race and ethnicity. He ends up focusing on restrictions 
involving same-sex sexual conduct. He admits that speech 
restrictions do not prevent people from opposing laws prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Instead, they 
restrict people from saying that gays or lesbians are immoral or 
 
 22. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 548. 
 23. Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s 
Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989). 
 24. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 536. 
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disordered. Although Weinstein has found some cases enforcing 
this in limited contexts, it is not at all clear to me that such 
restrictions have had much deterrent value, nor is it clear just what 
the scope of these restrictions are. For example, officials of the 
Catholic Church have been singing this bad song for centuries and 
they have not stopped. Moreover, Weinstein opposes these 
restrictions only when they affect public discourse,25 and in this 
European law for the most part follows suit. This leaves broad 
room for the expression of prejudiced views in the private sphere. 
Nonetheless, Weinstein argues that those who have been 
prevented from expressing the view even in limited public fora 
that same-sex sexual conduct is immoral or disordered have no 
political (as opposed to a moral) obligation to obey anti-
discrimination laws.26 By this he means that those restricted need 
not feel the obligation to obey these laws just because they are 
laws.27 One might think that this is a straightforward application 
of Habermas’ thesis that just laws cannot be legitimized without a 
just process.28 
But Weinstein’s conclusion is overdrawn. It simply begs the 
question of proper remedy.29 If one is faced with an improper 
restriction, the appropriate course would be to seek a restraining 
order or damages. If one loses and does not receive a remedy, one 
should try to move in the political system to overturn the 
restriction. It is not at all obvious that the existence of the 
restriction confers a license to disobey an anti-discrimination 
statute. That, however, is what Weinstein maintains. He 
apparently supposes that but for the hate speech restrictions 
(blocking speech which itself ordinarily appeals to extremists with 
a broader potential for alienation), an anti-discrimination law 
 
 25. It strikes me as odd that material with public content would not fall within the 
category of public discourse, and perhaps Weinstein does not intend to exclude it. But see 
Weinstein, supra note 1, at 559–60. 
 26. Id. at 561. 
 27. Id. at 534 n.25, 564 n.136. 
 28. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS (William Rehg trans., The 
MIT Press reprt. ed. 1998) (1996) (Habermas calls this the co-originality thesis). 
 29. One would think that the appropriate response to the injustice of process (as well 
as to unjust laws) would at least depend upon the subjective and objective importance of 
resistance, the seriousness of the injustice, the effectiveness of the response, and the 
possible injury to innocent victims associated with the response. See also supra note 19. 
For an intellectual history of the question when and whether violence is an appropriate 
response to injustice among American radicals, see MARC STEARS, DEMANDING 
DEMOCRACY: AMERICAN RADICALS IN SEARCH OF A NEW POLITICS (2013). 
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would have been blocked. This supposition is dubious. Weinstein 
points to no example. So we are left with the claim that a lawful 
restriction without likely practical consequence licenses some 
persons (those who were restrained), but not others to disobey a 
just law. Nor are we presented with any reflection regarding how 
many other laws would be subject to disobedience licenses 
because of the existence of bad or imperfect process.30 
Beyond political obligation, Weinstein recognizes that the 
crucial question is whether the state can morally enforce the law 
against those deterred by speech restrictions. That issue for 
Weinstein preliminarily turns on whether their objections to the 
law are reasonable.31 I do not think this question gets the 
consideration it deserves. On the one hand, one might think that 
these views (with which I have no sympathy) cannot simply be 
dismissed as unreasonable given that they have been held for 
centuries. On the other hand, those views for the most part are 
Biblically based. The non-Biblical arguments in my view can 
comfortably be dismissed as unreasonable, and, meanwhile, at 
least in the United States, the Biblical arguments cannot be 
accepted as good reasons precisely because the Establishment 
Clause precludes government from taking theological positions. 
In European countries, however, lacking an Establishment 
Clause, I am just not sure whether government can dismiss long 
held Biblical views as not reasonable. 
Without discussing this, Weinstein asserts that anti-
discrimination laws on the basis of sexual orientation have 
substantial enough moral weight to outweigh the concerns of 
those who were prevented from expressing views relevant to the 
law. I agree with this conclusion, but there is an ipse dixit flavor to 
the discussion. 
At this point, Weinstein comes to the payoff – a case where 
he contends that the illegitimacy argument is said to bear fruit. 
The case is a variation on Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock.32 
In that case, a commercial photographer refused to photograph a 
 
 30. For similar argumentation, see Jeremy Waldron, The Conditions of Legitimacy: 
A Response to James Weinstein, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 697 (2017). 
 31. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 566–67. 
 32. Although the corporation is called Elane Photography, LLC, the photographer’s 
name is Elaine Huguenin. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 59 (N.M. 
2013). The corporation was closely held between the photographer and her husband. For 
discussion of the free speech claims in the case, see Steven Shiffrin, What is Wrong with 
Compelled Speech?, 29 J. L. & POL. 499 (2014). 
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same-sex commitment ceremony primarily because she was 
religiously opposed to such ceremonies. Weinstein imagines in his 
variation that the photographer was deterred in a European 
country from participating in a demonstration opposing among 
other things anti-discrimination laws based on sexual orientation. 
He contends that applying the law to her in these circumstances 
may render the law immoral as applied to her.33 
In other words, other photographers with religious 
objections can be compelled to violate their religious beliefs, but 
not those who were deterred from participating in demonstrations 
bearing on the anti-discrimination laws. I think the Willock case 
presents a difficult issue. Gays and lesbians should be able to 
participate in the market on an equal footing with other citizens. 
At the same time, individuals should not be compelled to violate 
their religious beliefs in the absence of a powerful showing. It can 
be argued that someone involved in commerce has an obligation 
to serve everyone. But this tells evangelical Christians and 
practitioners of some other religions that they cannot be wedding 
photographers, not to mention many other occupations. 
Moreover, in the Willock case there were many dozens of 
commercial photographers available to work at such a ceremony. 
It is not at all clear why any gay or lesbian couple would want to 
hire a photographer who religiously opposes same-sex 
commitment ceremonies.34 I conclude that commercial 
photographers should not be compelled to violate their religion in 
this kind of case even if they were not deterred from protesting an 
anti-discrimination statute. The legitimacy argument would have 
no bearing. Indeed, I would be reluctant to adopt a rule that 
excused some from obeying a law, but not others, based on their 
willingness to participate in demonstrations, rather than their 
sincerely held religious beliefs. 
CONCLUSION 
Weinstein has offered an intriguing presentation for a 
position that I do not happen to share. This does not mean that I 
 
 33. Weinstein discusses some other cases involving landlords in Britain, but the 
record does not show any deterrence of opposition to the legislation and the legal 
restrictions on the opportunity to do so are far less stringent. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 
569–74. 
 34. Willock was unaware of the views held by Elane when she tried to hire her. 
Willock, 309 P.3d at 59–60. 
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endorse all hate speech restrictions. I do think that our 
Constitution should make room for the narrow prescription of 
targeted racist insults35 and of “speech with a message of racial 
inferiority, that is directed against a historically oppressed group, 
and that is persecutorial, hateful, and degrading.”36 I also think it 
was wrong for the courts to conclude that a march of Nazis in 
Skokie should be constitutionally protected. If the Nazis had 
marched in Skokie, there would have been tens of thousands of 
counter demonstrators and major bloodshed. Allowing them to 
demonstrate was a river boat gamble.37 
In the wake of an election in which it is possible that racist 
speech was a but for cause (along with many others) of the 
election results, it might be tempting (assuming vagueness 
concerns could be surmounted) to conclude that the United States 
should take an even larger page from the direction taken by 
Canada and countries in Europe. Nonetheless, it is at least 
arguable that general hate speech restrictions would promote 
racism rather than effectively combat it. We live in a racist society. 
It is possible that hate speech restrictions would be conceived as 
yet another measure to cater to minorities while the needs of 
white citizens are ignored. It is possible that those who are 
subjected to sanctions for hate speech will wrap themselves in the 
American flag and gain sympathy. Whether this line of argument 
against hate speech restrictions should be accepted depends upon 
empirical conditions.38 But it does not assume that hate speech 
restrictions implicate substantial First Amendment value, nor 
does it join Weinstein in fearing that they lead to illegitimate 
legislation, deny respect to citizens, engage in impermissible 
point-of-view discrimination, or deny the equal opportunity to 
participate in the political process. 
 
 
 35. For a detailed discussion of how to apply this principle, see SHIFFRIN, supra note 
14, at 76 n.161. 
 36. Matsuda, supra note 23, at 2357. I would consider extending Matsuda’s approach 
beyond the racial context. It should be noted that Matsuda’s definition among other things 
would not cover scholarly arguments for racial superiority and the like. Apart from what I 
say in the text, I would protect these communications as well. 
 37. The gamble worked. The Nazis did not march in Skokie because of the realistic 
fear of violence. See STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, WHAT’S WRONG WITH THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT?, 42–43 (2016). 
 38. SHIFFRIN, supra note 14, at 80–87. 
